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INTRODUCTION
The disclosure function figures prominently in many accounts of
the utility patent system.1 But what of its role in the design patent
system? Should it be dismissed as trivial? And if so, what are the practical
consequences for design patent doctrine in view of the fact that the
doctrines that implement the disclosure function in utility patent law also
apply to design patents by statutory mandate? 2
The disclosure theory posits that patent documents disclose
technical information that serves as a quid pro quo for the patent grant. 3
Even aside from controversies about whether the disclosure function is
robust for utility patents, 4 the lack of fit with design patents may seem
self-evident: the design patent disclosure is not intended to convey
technical information. Its chief purpose is to provide notice to the public
as to the subject matter that the design patent protects, as the claims do
in utility patents. 5 Perhaps Judge Rich had this in mind when he wrote
the opinion for the en banc court in Racing Strollers, Inc. v. TRI
Industries, Inc.,6 observing that the § 112 best mode requirement is "not
applicable" to design patents and that complying with "the remaining
requirements of 112" simply entails that the document contain
"illustrations ... depicting the ornamental design." 7
1. See, e.g., Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539, 547-54 (2009); Sean
B. Seymore, The Teaching Function of Patents, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621, 641 (2010).
2. 35 U.S.C. § 171(b) (2012) ("The provisions of this title relating to patents for inventions
shall apply to patents for designs, except as otherwise provided.").
3. See, e.g., Seymore, supra note 1, at 622.
4. There are many such controversies. See, e.g., Alan Devlin, The Misunderstood Function of
Disclosure in Patent Law, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 401 (2010); Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Do Patents
Disclose Useful Information?, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 545 (2012); Sean B. Seymore, Making Patents
Useful, 98 MINN. L. REV. 1046 (2014); Note, The Disclosure Function of the Patent System (or Lack
Thereof), 118 HARV. L. REV. 2007 (2005).
5. See, e.g., Hupp v. Siroflex of Am., Inc., 122 F.3d 1456, 1464 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (noting that
"the drawings are the claims to the patented subject matter" in modern design patents); GRAEE B.
DINWOODIE & MARK D. JANIS, TRADE DRESS AND DESIGN LAW 297-380 (2011).
6. 878 F.2d 1418, 1418 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (en banc). The Federal Circuit had taken the case on
interlocutory appeal en banc to decide whether, as a matter of law, a design patent application could
be filed as a divisional of an earlier-filed utility patent application, claiming the benefit of the utility
patent application's filing date. Id. at 1420-21 (answering yes and overruling a prior C.C.P.A.
decision that had held to the contrary, In re Campbell, 216 F.2d 606 (C.C.P.A. 1954)). Campbell seems
to have been decided without regard for 35 U.S.C. § 120, and the PTO evidently had come to regard
it as erroneous and had been ignoring it.
7. Judge Rich reasoned that the best mode requirement did not apply because "a design has
only one 'mode' and it can be described only by illustrations showing what it looks like (though some
added description in words may be useful to explain the illustrations)." Racing Strollers, 878 F.2d at
1420. As for the "remaining" requirements, Judge Rich seemed to be focusing exclusively on the
written description requirement applied in the context of a claim to priority in an earlier-filed
application. He asserted that compliance was "simply a question of whether the earlier application
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To be sure, a modern design patent disclosure differs radically
from a utility patent disclosure in format and content. A typical design
patent contains only drawing figures, 8 a brief description identifying
those figures, and a single pro forma claim that refers to the figures in a
prescribed format, 9 along with routine bibliographic information found in
all patents. The United States Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO")
regulations strongly discourage any additional written disclosure. 10
On the other hand, design patent disclosures and utility patent
disclosures function alike in some respects. In addition to conveying
technical information, a utility patent's disclosure supports the notice
function of the claims, 11 playing a critical role in regulating scope through
claim construction doctrines 12 and enablement, 13 and a corollary role in
some cases in providing evidence of possession of the invention through
the written description doctrine. 14 Design patent disclosures share these
aspirations, suggesting that the doctrine and theory of design patent
disclosures, like their counterparts in utility patent law, deserve scrutiny.
We engage in that scrutiny here. In Part II, we offer the results of
new historical and empirical research based on legislative,
administrative, and judicial records. We show through empirical work
that in early practice, design patent documents often relied on extensive
verbal disclosures and sometimes included elaborate claim sets. We
demonstrate that design patent drafting practices shifted dramatically
during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, ushering in an era
contains illustrations, whatever form they may take, depicting the ornamental design illustrated in
the later application and claimed therein by the prescribed formal claim." Id.; see also infra Part
III.B. (discussing the role of the written description requirement in modern design patent law).
8. The drawings are to include "a sufficient number of views to constitute a complete
disclosure of the appearance of the design." 37 C.F.R. § 1.152 (2015); see also U.S. PATENT &
TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 1503.02 (9th ed. 2014) (specifying
additional restrictions on the use of surface shading, the use of broken lines, and the substitution of
photographs for drawings, among other details) [hereinafter MPEP].
9. 37 C.F.R. § 1.153(a) (2015) (specifying that "[t]he claim shall be in formal terms to the
ornamental design for the article (specifying name) as shown, or as shown and described" and that
"[m]ore than one claim is neither required nor permitted"). In the rare instance when the design
patent document includes additional written disclosure, the words "and described" are to be added
to the pro forma claim. MPEP, supra note 8, § 1503.01.
10. 37 C.F.R. § 1.153 ("No description, other than a reference to the drawings, is ordinarily
required."); Cf. MPEP, supra note 8, § 1503.01 (specifying that additional description, while not
required, is also not prohibited). Any such additional description is usually confined to the purpose
of clarifying the content of the drawings.
11. See, e.g., Jason Rantanen, Patent Law's Disclosure Requirement, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 369,
378 (2013) (recognizing additional functions beyond the teaching function).
12. See, e.g., Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1314-15 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (encouraging
courts to resort to the written description to illuminate the construction of disputed claim terms).
13. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012).
14. Id.; Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc).
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of "visual information" in which design patent documents took on their
modern form, and we analyze the combination of forces that may have
brought about that shift.
In Part III, we turn to modern practice. We canvass the case law
applying several § 112 disclosure doctrines to design patents, 15 and we
conclude with some observations about restriction practice in design
patents. 16 In all of these areas, we conclude that courts and the PTO have
struggled to develop a coherent approach to design patent disclosures
that borrows appropriately from utility patent jurisprudence while
accounting for the visual qualities that make design patents different.
While this has resulted in periodic convulsions in technical doctrine,
there is something more fundamental afoot here. In particular, we detect
contradictions as to what constitutes the protected design subject matter
in a design patent-a problem that resides beneath the surface in design
patent disclosure cases but could disrupt the stability of the design patent
system if left unaddressed.
I. VERBAL TO VISUAL: DESIGN PATENT DISCLOSURES
IN EARLY DESIGN PATENT PRACTICE
Many early design patent documents look fundamentally unlike
their modern counterparts in two respects. First, design patent
disclosures did not always adhere to the modern model of primarily visual
information. Second, design patents exhibited a wide variety of claiming
approaches. The transition to a predominantly visual design patent
disclosure took many decades to occur, while the change to a single
mandatory pro forma claim was the product of discrete regulation. But
both changes followed an extended period during which lawyers
experimented with an array of drafting strategies, and the Patent Office
responded to those strategies. This occurred with little evidence of any
coherent policy position on the role of the description (or the claims) in
achieving the goals of the design patent system and with little reflection
on the constraints of the statute, which arguably insisted on adherence
to utility patent principles.
In this Part, we present the results of a series of empirical projects
that examine the drafting practices adopted in design patents during the
regime's first century of existence, and we provide some evidence that the
system has shifted towards a predominantly visual model of disclosure.
Our descriptive analysis is based on a stratified random sample of design
patents that were proportionally allocated by year. In total, we sampled
15. See infra Part III.A. (enablement/definiteness); Part III.B. (written description).
16. See infra Part III.C.
1634 [Vol. 69:6:1631
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11,870 design patents, which represents 8.85 percent of the total patents
granted over this time period. We collected information about the written
description portion of the specification, the claims, and the drawings, and
we analyze each in the subparts below. The full details of our research
design are supplied in the Appendix.
A. The Evolving Role of the Design Patent Specification
The statutory provisions governing design patents have never
drawn a distinction between design patent disclosures and utility patent
disclosures. The original American design patent legislation, passed in
1842,17 was silent on the requirements for design patent disclosures.
Accordingly, by virtue of the 1842 Act's incorporation clause, 18 the utility
patent requirements for disclosures applied to design patents. 19 Before
1870, the applicable provisions required, at a minimum: an enabling
disclosure; a sufficiently definite indication of what was protected; a set
of drawings (at least "where the nature of the case admits of drawings");
and a model ("in all cases which admit of a representation by model"). 20
Design patent practice under these provisions was widely variant.
Some early design patents had extensive verbal descriptions with
feature-by-feature descriptions of the accompanying drawings-
documents that are essentially indistinguishable from utility patent
documents. 21  Others employed very brief verbal descriptions
accompanied by illustrations. 22
A trend towards regulating design patent disclosures with greater
specificity began in the 1870s. 23 Whereas the Patent Office's 1870 Rules
17. Act of Aug. 29, 1842, ch. 263, § 3, 5 Stat. 543, 548-49 (1842). For background, see Jason J.
Du Mont & Mark D. Janis, The Origins of American Design Patent Protection, 88 IND. L.J. 837 (2013).
18. Act of Aug. 29, 1842 § 3 (specifying that "all the regulations and provisions which now apply
to the obtaining or protection of patents not inconsistent with the provisions of this act shall apply
to applications under this section").
19. See Jason J. Du Mont, A Non-Obvious Design: Reexamining the Origins of the Design Patent
Standard, 45 GONZ. L. REV. 531, 543, 548, 564, 578-88 (2009) (providing a historical account of the
incorporation clause).
20. Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, § 6, 5 Stat. 117, 119 (1836). Regarding application of the model
requirement to design patents, see Kendall J. Dood, Patent .,1odels and the Patent Lawi: 1790 1880
(Part I[ Conclusion), 65 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 234, 271 (1983).
21. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. D4,963 (issued May 30, 1871); U.S. Patent No. D4,900 (issued
May 23, 1871); U.S. Patent No. D2,477 (issued Oct. 2, 1866); U.S. Patent No. D2,531 (issued Dec. 18,
1866).
22. See, e.g.,; U.S. Patent No. D4,918 (issued May 23, 1871); U.S. Patent No. D2,662 (issued
June 4, 1867); U.S. Patent No. D2,516 (issued Dec. 4, 1866).
23. The 1870 Act largely reinstated the enablement requirement from prior legislation and
amplified the definiteness requirement to emphasize formal claiming, requiring that applicants
"particularly point out and distinctly claim the part, improvement, or combination which he claims
as his invention or discovery." Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 26, 16 Stat. 198, 201 (1870); cf. Act of
20161 1635
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of Practice had merely called for design patent specifications to be "the
same as for other patents,"24 the 1871 Rules required that the
specifications "distinctly point out the characteristic features of the
design, and carefully distinguish between what is old and what is held to
be new." 25 The Patent Office amended the rules again in 1879, adding
more detailed requirements for the content of the design patent
application, including a requirement for a "[d]etailed description of the
design as it appears in the drawing or photograph, letters or figures of
reference being used."26 The Patent Office had also excused design patent
applicants from the model requirement in 1870,27 which may have
elevated further the importance of the written disclosure. The treatise
writer Hector Fenton noted this shift, asserting that the Patent Office
had previously permitted "undue laxity in the preparation of [design
patent] specifications," whereas "more recently design patent
applications have been closely scrutinized, and the same degree of care
and particularity of description and claim required of applicants in the
preparation of specifications for such patents, as for patents for other
inventions."28
Yet there was little evidence of any emerging consensus in the
patent community about the function that a design patent specification
was intended to perform or about the necessary rules for supporting that
function. 29 For example, in one line of decisions, the Patent Office pushed
for more streamlined disclosures by forcing applicants to delete any
material in the design patent that described the mechanical functions of
the article with which the design was associated or the methods by which
July 4, 1836, § 6 (requiring that the applicant "particularly specify and point out the part,
improvement, or combination, which he claims as his own invention or discovery").
24. U.S. PATENT OFFICE, RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR PROCEEDINGS IN THE PATENT OFFICE,
Rule 81 (1870) [hereinafter 1870 RULES] ("The petition, oath, specification, and other proceedings in
the case of applications for letter-patent for a design are the same as for other patents.").
25. U.S. PATENT OFFICE, RULES OF PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT OFFICE, Rule 81
(1871) [hereinafter 1871 RULES]; see also 1871 RULES, supra, Rule 14 (imposing this same rule on
utility patent disclosures under Rule 14).
26. U.S. PATENT OFFICE, RULES OF PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT OFFICE, Rule 80
(1880).
27. The 1870 Rules specified that "[w]hen a work of design can be sufficiently represented by a
drawing, a model will not be required." 1870 RULES, supra note 24, Rule 82. By contrast, for utility
patents, the default rule was that models were required, although applicants were permitted to
"submit to the Commissioner" the question whether they could be excused from providing a model in
a given case. 1870 RULES, supra note 24, Rule 24.
28. HECTOR T. FENTON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR DESIGNS 60 (Philadelphia, William J.
Campbell 1889).
29. See id. (observing that "[m]uch difference of opinion has existed among patent practitioners,
as to the essential requisites of a design specification").
1636 [Vol. 69:6:1631
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the articles were constructed. 30 The concern was that such disclosures
might mislead the unwary public into believing that the design patent
actually conferred utility patent-like protection, covering mechanical
functions or methods of construction. 31 In these decisions, then, the
Patent Office essentially was using the disclosure rules to regulate
subject matter eligibility (and perhaps scope of protection) in the nature
of a quasi-functionality doctrine. 32
Some practitioners pushed in exactly the opposite direction,
embracing a strategy that favored extensive verbal disclosures to
accompany the drawings, with the goal of broadening the scope of
protection beyond the strict confines of the depicted design. 33 A lawyer
drafting a design patent disclosure might interject alternative or
conditional language highlighting specific features, for example. 34
Other practitioners seemed to favor minimal disclosures. Indeed,
some practitioners submitted design patent applications that included no
verbal disclosure whatsoever, just drawings and the requisite identifying
information. Such a patent was at issue in Dobson v. Dornan.35 The
design patent in suit in Dobson, which was directed to a carpet pattern,
included a photograph, a one-sentence verbal description ("The nature of
my design is fully represented in the accompanying photographic
30. See, e.g., Exparte Norton, 1882 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 14, 15 ("Applicant, however, must strike
out of his application everything descriptive of the mechanical functions of the device."); Ex parte
Fairchild, 1873 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 45, 45 ("All description of the mechanical construction of the article
should be eliminated, as well as all reference to its purpose as a matter of utility. All matter of this
description is improper in a design patent."); Exparte Diffenderfer, 1872 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 154, 155
(noting that "the applicant should be required to erase from his description all references to the
function of the standard, or any portion thereof, described").
31. Commissioner Mortimer Leggett described such design patent applicants as "imposters"
and argued that they "desire a design patent merely to obtain the right to put the word 'patented'
upon their manufacture, and thereby deceive the public and wrong real inventors, for they well know
that not one person in ten thousand will ever learn the fact that the patent only covers the design."
Exparte Parkinson, 1871 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 251, 252.
32. No formal functionality doctrine existed until 1902, when the ornamentality requirement
was added to the statute at the behest of Commissioner Allen. See Jason J. Du Mont & Mark D.
Janis, Functionality in Design Protection Systems, 19 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 261, 264-65 (2012)
(discussing the legislative history).
33. Cf Untermeyer v. Jeannot, 20 F. 503, 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1884) (declining to extend the scope of
the design patent at issue beyond the design depicted in the accompanying photograph where the
verbal description lacked broadening language); WILLIAM D. SHOEMAKER, PATENTS FOR DESIGNS 169
(1929) (suggesting that applicants had "sought through added description ... to broaden the patent"
by stressing that certain visual features were "dominating in importance" or were "immaterial").
34. By contrast, lawyers drafting utility patent applications may have the impulse to omit
certain details strategically to avoid the risk that those details will be used to narrow the claims, or
to preserve the details as trade secrets.
35. Dobson v. Dornan, 118 U.S. 10, 14 (1886); see JASON J. DU MONT & MARK D. JANIS,
AMERICAN DESIGN PATENT LAW: A LEGAL HISTORY ch. 6 (forthcoming 2016) (analyzing the Dobson
case record).
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illustration, to which reference is made.") and a pro forma claim ("I claim
as my invention, the configuration of the design hereunto annexed, when
applied to carpeting."). 36 The alleged infringer claimed that the patent
was invalid for failing to comply with the requirement to provide a
written description of the invention and to "particularly point out ani
distinctly claim the part, improvement, or combination which he claims
as his invention or discovery." 37
The Court dismissed this argument summarily. The description
and claim complied witl the statute, the Court concluded. The patent
described and claimed the subject matter that "the photographic
illustration represents as a whole," when applied to carpeting.38 Tlat
subject matter was "better represented by the photographic illustration
than it could be by any description, and a description would probably not
be intelligible without the illustration." 3 9
The reference to the design "as a whole" was crucial. The Court
seemed to be saying that it was perfectly fine for a patentee to rely on an
illustration, rather than on any elaborate verbal description, because the
scope of the design patent's claim would be limited to include all of the
details of the illustration. As applied to the carpet design at issue in
Dobson, the Court reasoned that "the claim ... covers the design as a
whole, and not any part of it as a part, and it is to be tested as a whole as
to novelty and infringement. 4°
The Dobson vision of the role of the design patent disclosure was
entirely at odds with the role of the disclosure in utility patent law, and
some commentators struggled to accept it. 4 1 Nonetheless, by way of a
36. U.S. Patent No. D6,822 (issued Aug. 19, 1873).
37. Patent Act of 1870, § 26, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198 (1870).
38. Dobson, 118 U.S. at 14.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 15. A similar debate had long festered in British design registration law. In
Holdsworth v. McCrea, 2 L.R. 380 (H.L. 1867), the registrant had deposited a sample of fabric bearing
the registered design, unaccompanied by any description in writing, relying on Copyright of Designs
Act, 1858, 21 & 22 Vict. c. 70, § 5 (permitting applicants to register a design by submitting a "pattern
or portion of an article" bearing the design). The alleged infringer argued that the registrant's sample
included multiple design elements, and it was impossible for anyone to tell whether the registrant
was claiming protection for the entirety or some subset of elements. The issue made its way to the
House of Lords, which upheld the validity of the registration but seemed to suggest that the scope of
protection would be limited to "replicas" of the sample. Holdsworth, 2 L.R. at 387-88 (speech of Lord
Westbury). After decades of debate, the British courts finally decided that the reference to "replicas"
did not mean that exact identity between the registered and alleged infringing designs was required.
See Du MONT & JANIS, supra note 35, ch. 5 (summarizing the debate).
41. Fenton was certain that the Court had gone too far. The fact that the Court had approved
of this "laxity" in disclosure practice was lamentable because its effect was to "reduce the grade of
[design] patents, and convert them into simple certificates of registration or a drawing." FENTON,
supra note 28, at 60. Fenton perhaps should have mentioned that it was he who had made the
1638 [Vol. 69:6:1631
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series of rule changes and Commissioner's decisions, the Patent Office
began to formalize the exceptional status of design disclosures, moving
the focus away from extensive verbal disclosure. By 1897, the Patent
Office had eliminated the requirement that design patent specifications
distinguish old elements from new. 42 The 1897 Rules of Practice also
expressly prohibited design patent applicants from including descriptions
of mechanical function and the like in their design patent specifications. 43
At the same time, the Patent Office began to recommend the use of a
single, pro forma claim that incorporated by reference the illustrations
and the verbal disclosure, 44 a matter that we discuss in more detail in
Part 11.13.
The most significant indication of the exceptionalist view comes
from a set of controversial decisions in which the Patent Office sought to
transform the Dobson holding into a prohibition against verbal
disclosures. Commissioner Allen started along this path in Ex parte
Freeman,45 expressing distaste for written disclosures in design patent
applications:
In designs the appearance is the new thing which is to be secured by a patent. Words do not
explain, but rather confuse, when added to the disclosure of the drawing. For this reason
such descriptive material should be reduced to a minimum, or, better still, entirely
eliminated from design patent specifications. There can be no place in a design patent
specification for such descriptions as are intended to differentiate between material and
immaterial elements, the test of which is the effect produced upon the eye of the beholder. 4 6
This was a curious sentiment to express in a case where the entirety of
the written description appears to have occupied no more than a short
paragraph and seems to be little more than a formulaic description of the
drawings rather than any aggressive effort to broaden the scope of
disclosure challenge that the Court had rejected in the Dobson case, as he had represented the alleged
infringer Dobson.
42. U.S. PATENT OFFICE, RULES OF PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT OFFICE, Rule 81
(1897) [hereinafter 1897 RULES] ("The specification must distinctly point out the characteristic
features of the design ...."). The Office further amended this language in 1903, requiring that the
specification must "distinctly describe the article in its aspect of shape or configuration and
ornamentation. U.S. PATENT OFFICE, RULES OF PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT OFFICE,
Rule 81 (1903) [hereinafter 1903 RULES].
43. 1897 RULES, supra note 42, Rule 84:
A design ... is to be shown and described in its aspect of shape or pattern only. Hence,
reference to the materials used or the mode of their utilization in the construction of the
article to which the design is applied, or the mechanical construction of the article, can
not properly enter into the description of the design.
44. 1903 RULES, supra note 42, Rule 81 ("The claim may properly be, in the broadest form, for
the ornamental design, substantially as shown and described.").
45. 1903 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 172.
46. Id.
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coverage. Regardless, the rejection had been based on prior art, and the
Commissioner Allen upheld it. 47
The 1904 Rules appeared to move substantially further. The
Patent Office once again amended its rules on the content of design
patent disclosures, no longer mandating the inclusion of a "detailed
description of the design" as it appeared in the drawing, but rather simply
calling for "a description of the figure or figures of the drawing."48 In
addition, amended Rule 81 no longer referred to the specification or any
expectation that it would contain a written description, but instead
expressed the view that "since the appearance can be disclosed only by a
picture of the article, the claim should be in the broadest form for the
article as shown."49
Soon afterwards, in Exparte Mygatt, 50 Commissioner Allen sought
to impose an affirmative prohibition against verbal disclosures. There,
the Patent Office had required a design patent applicant to delete "certain
descriptive matter contained in the specification," and the applicant
petitioned Commissioner Allen to have that requirement set aside.
According to the Commissioner, whereas the description related to "the
mechanical construction of the device," the design patent statute, of
course, was directed to the ornamental appearance of an article and had
"nothing to do with the use to which it is put, the functions which it
performs, or to its mechanical construction." 51 Accordingly, the
Commissioner ruled that "[d]escription of these matters, therefore, is not
only unnecessary, but is confusing and misleading." 52  Because
infringement deals with identity of appearance, rather than function, use,
or construction, "t]he description should not deal with these matters,
47. Id. On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, the applicant challenged
the Commissioner's statement about descriptions, but the court seemed to consider the
Commissioner's statement innocuous:
Undoubtedly, in the matter of application for a patent for a design, a picture of the design
serves to convey a greatly more adequate idea of the design than any verbal description
could possibly do; and, in the presence of the picture, a superadded verbal description is
generally useless and oftentimes confusing. This is all that the Commissioner said, or
apparently intended to say; and, as it is the dictate of reason, common sense, and common
experience, we fail to find any error in it.
In re Freeman, 23 App. D.C. 226, 229 (D.C. Cir. 1904). The applicant's description illustrated "the
utter futility of attempting by words to describe the appearance of an object which may be perceived
immediately upon inspection of a picture thereof," according to the court. Id. at 229-30. Regardless,
the court concluded that the Commissioner's statement about descriptions did not affect the prior art
rejection, which was correctly sustained. Id. at 230-31.
48. U.S. PATENT OFFICE, RULES OF PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT OFFICE, Rule 82,
28 (1904).
49. Id. Rule 81.
50. 1905 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 243.
51. Id.
52. Id.
1640 [Vol. 69:6:1631
DISCLOSING DESIGNS
since it would lead the unskilled to suppose that they constituted the
essential elements of the design for which protection is furnished by the
design patent."53 Applying those principles to the application at issue,
Commissioner Allen concluded that the applicant's written description
was "unnecessary."54 The applicant's description attempted to put into
words what was already shown in the drawings, and "[t]he present
practice of the Office is to dispense with all such description as surplusage
and as calculated to mislead." 55
On appeal in Mygatt, the Court of Appeals of the District of
Columbia swiftly condemned the Patent Office's approach. 56 The Court of
Appeals pointed out that Dornan had merely approved of the use of the
drawing to comply with the disclosure requirements, rather than
prohibiting the use of additional written disclosure. 57 A rule forbidding
additional disclosure would seem to be in conflict with the statute, the
court opined. 58 Moreover, to the extent that the Patent Office was
objecting to the use of additional disclosure for "fiscal reason[s],"
(presumably meaning that the Patent Office feared that design patent
examination would be more complex and costly), those reasons were "not
entitled to much consideration" because design descriptions would be
relatively short even when used, and the Patent Office could seek to limit
the use of unduly extensive descriptions. 59
While Commissioner Allen failed in his effort to create an anti-
disclosure requirement for design patents, his bias in favor of visual
information, and his view of verbal disclosures in design patents as
generally unhelpful, has arguably persisted. The language of the 1904
Rules of Practice lingered. 60 In 1959, the Patent Office promulgated the
direct predecessors to the modern regulations governing design patent
practice, which provided that verbal descriptions were ordinarily not
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. In re Mygatt, 26 App. D.C. 366, 375 (D.C. Cir. 1905).
57. Id. at 373 (asserting that Dobson did not hold "that no further description is permissible at
the election of the applicant, or that he may not more particularly point out his invention in his
claim").
58. Id.
59. Id. at 373-74. The court reversed the rejection, noting that it seemed odd for the Patent
Office to call for a model of the design at issue (as if the drawing alone did not sufficiently disclose
the design), but then purport to prohibit the applicant from including verbal descriptions of the
design in addition to the drawings.
60. See, e.g., U.S. PATENT OFFICE, RULES OF PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT OFFICE,
Rules 81-82 (1920).
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appropriate (and certainly not required) for design patents. 61 But these
regulatory developments occurred in the absence of any express statutory
mandate to distinguish design patents from utility patents in regards to
disclosure requirements 62 and without the development of any coherent
concept of the role of the disclosure in design patent documents.
Our empirical analysis provides evidence that the verbal
information in design patent documents decreased over the latter half of
the nineteenth century. It also indicates that the transition was not
smooth, perhaps corroborating our historical analysis of the conflicting
forces that would have influenced drafting strategies.
To assess the amount of verbal information in design patent
documents, we measured the specification length for all of the design
patents in our sample, defining specification length for this purpose as
the length (in inches) of any written content except the patent's title and
bibliographic information-essentially, the written description and
claims. 63 The following graph depicts the change in mean specification
length of the design patents in our sample for each year, after omitting
all years with fewer than twenty-five observations 64 and all handwritten
patents. 65
61. Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights, 37 C.F.R. § 1.153(a) (1959); see id. § 1.154(b)
(specifying the elements that "should be observed" in a design patent specification, identifying a
"description of the figure or figures of the drawing" and a "description, if any").
62. Indeed, these developments were arguably in tension with the mandate of the incorporation
provision. See FENTON, supra note 28, at 59-60 ("It is quite true that a design may be fully described
to the mind by lines in a drawing, yet the statute [(i.e., the incorporation clause)], in express words,
requires a specific and particularized written description and claim in addition to a drawing.").
63. See infra Appendix for complete methodological details.
64. A minimum quantity of observations was set to avoid potential distortions caused by
outliers, and was carried throughout the empirical portion of this Article where figures are used to
display shifts in annual mean values. However, the precise number of minimum observations was
arbitrarily chosen. In Figure 1-which is restricted to non-handwritten patents-1867 was the first
year with at least twenty-five observations in our sample. Based on these restrictions, from 1867
through 1942, our sample included 152 observations per year on average. However, because our
sample is proportionally allocated by the number of patents granted each year, and this quantity
grew tremendously over this time horizon, there is a great deal of variance in the average number of
observations: x=152.96, s=124.29, Q1=65, Q2=101, Q3=215.5, n=76.
65. Handwritten patents disappeared from our sample entirely by 1866, when the Patent Office
began printing issued patents. See THOMAS C. THEAKER, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF
PATENTS 8 (1868) (indicating that printing commenced on November 20, 1866). While the Patent
Office eventually printed of all utility patents granted after the passage of the 1836 Act, it did not do
the same for design patents (granted since 1842).
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As shown in Figure 1, our results may be divided chronologically
into three distinct periods: (1) a period of increasing specification length
from 1867 until about 1901, (2) a period of precipitous decline from 1901
to 1904, and finally (3) a period of very slight decline from 1904 to 1942.
The observed growth in average specification length prior to the
turn of the twentieth century (Period 1) may indicate that the strategy of
using a robust disclosure to seek a wide scope of protection was a popular
one, and that the 1870 Act and Patent Office rules were perceived to call
for more extensive disclosure, at least on balance. 66
The sharp decline of specification length observed after the turn
of the century (Period 2) coincides with Commissioner Allen's failed
efforts to institute an anti-disclosure rule (e.g., in Freeman and Mygatt).
But the decline also straddles the passage of the ornamentality
requirement in the 1902 Act. Ironically, then, it was in all likelihood a
functionality restriction, not a disclosure requirement, that had the
biggest impact on disclosure drafting practices in our sample.
Finally, our data also shows that extensive verbal disclosures
never returned to design patent documents after the early 1900s (Period
3). Although Commissioner Allen's outright prohibition against verbal
66. See supra notes 24-27, 33-34 and accompanying text.
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information did not become the prevailing rule, our data indicates that
short specifications became the norm, setting the stage for the modern
era of reliance on visual information.
B. Plural Claiming and the Shift to the Pro Forma Claim
Early design patent practice is remarkable in that patent lawyers
experimented with claim drafting techniques that are today exclusively
associated with utility patents-and the Patent Office endorsed this
practice, at least at first. 67 In 1869, in Ex parte Bartholomew,
Commissioner Fisher ruled that design patent applicants could direct
claims to a genus of designs based on the disclosure of an individual
species within the genus. 68 A year later, in Exparte Sheppard, he upheld
the use of plural claims in design patents, concluding that "[i]f the design
contains features which are new, singly and in combination, no reason is
known to me why they may not be so claimed."69 The 1871 Rules of
Practice likewise seemed to contemplate that design patents could
contain plural claims, specifying that these claims "should be as distinct
and specific as in the case of patents for inventions or discoveries." 70 As a
result, it became increasingly common to find design patents that
contained one or all of the following claim types: (1) pro forma claims that
contained little more than a preamble and reference the drawings (and
written description, when relevant), (2) claims to specific design elements
or unique combinations of those elements, and (3) genus claims where the
drawings contained one or more species of the design.
Our empirical work suggests that for several years during the
latter half of the nineteenth century, many patent lawyers took
67. But see WILLIAM EDGAR SIMONDS, THE LAW OF DESIGN PATENTS 196-99 (New York, Baker,
Voorhis & Co. 1874) (asserting that as of the mid-1870s, most design patents used a single, pro forma
claim).
68. 1869 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 103, 105 (noting that the Patent Office's practices on this matter
had not been uniformly applied, but concluding: "I have no hesitation in saying ... that a valid patent
may be granted for a new genus or class of ornaments, as well as for specific ornaments ..."); see
also SIMONDS, supra note 67, at 198 ("It will thus be seen that the courts and the Patent Office are
both committed to the doctrine of allowing claims to specific features of a design, both singly and in
combination.").
69. 1870 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 22. Fisher ruled that he "agree[d] with the examiner that there is
no provision, or fair construction of, the act relating to letters-patent for designs, which forbids the
union of two or more claims or clauses of claim in a single patent." Id. Fisher also pointed out that
past administrations had allowed design patents to issue with multiple claims. Id. The first published
design patent infringement decision likewise commented that a design patent ordinarily could
"include a patent for a combination, and an invention of some of the parts of which the combination
consists." Root v. Ball & Davis, 20 F. Cas. 1157, 1158 (C.C.D. Ohio 1846).
70. 1871 RULES, supra note 25, Rule 81. The Patent Office later hedged, adding the proviso
"when the design admits of it" to the sentence on design patent claims. U.S. PATENT OFFICE, RULES
OF PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT OFFICE (1879), Rule 80.
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advantage of the Patent Office's invitation to exercise creative judgment
in drafting design patent claims. The figure depicted below plots the
mean number of claims observed in the design patents in our sample,
excluding design patents issued in years with fewer than twenty-five
observations.
FIGURE 2: ANNUAL AVERAGE NUMBER OF CLAIMS
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As shown in Figure 2, the mean number of claims per design
patent in a given calendar year generally increased until reaching its
height in 1881, and then decreased thereafter. 71 When viewed as the
share of patents from each cohort with more than one claim, it is apparent
that multi-claim design patents were a common feature of the design
patent system from the 1870s through the late 1890s.
71. The peak reached in 1881 is partially driven by a set of outliers in our sample, containing
11, 13, and 15 claims, respectively: U.S. Patent No. D12,437 (issued Aug. 30, 1881); U.S. Patent No.
D12,199 (issued Mar. 29, 1881); U.S. Patent No. D12,288 (issued May 31, 1881). When these three
patents are removed, the increase leading to the 1881 peak is more gradual than Figure 2 depicts.
Specifically, removing the outliers reduced the annual mean number of claims per patent from 2.83
(s=3.35, n=52) to 2.20 (s=2.22, n=49).
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FIGURE 3: ANNUAL SHARE OF PATENTS WITH MORE THAN ONE CLAIM
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Indeed, in 1880 and 1881, about thirty-eight percent of our sample
contained more than one claim. As shown in Figures 3 and 4, the
phenomenon of plural claiming in design patents extended for about
thirty years, ending by the turn of the century. 72
According to Patent Office records, however, Commissioner Hall
began curtailing the practice in 1888. In one case, he ruled that the
applicant must amend his claims to include an express reference to the
figures. 73 He also rejected the use of genus claims in design patents
altogether and questioned strongly the use of claims directed to
individual design features. Commissioner Hall's reasoning remains
instructive today because it illustrates that fundamental insights about
what constituted the object of protection in design patents were still
crystallizing long after the design patent system was created. For
Commissioner Hall, the rejection of generic claiming was partly a
72. The last year in our sample with any observations ofpatents with more than one claim was
1898, containing one patent with four claims, three patents with three claims, and 158 patents with
only one claim.
73. Exparte Gerard, 1888 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 37, 39-40 (affirming the examiner's requirement
that the claims include the words "as shown and described," reasoning that those words signify that
a design patent is limited to "the very subject-matter 'shown and described' and its equivalents").
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response to the Supreme Court's Gorham v. White decision establishing
the design patent infringement standard. 74 That standard contemplated
liability for unauthorized designs that might not be identical copies of the
patented design, as long as they were substantially similar to the
ordinary observer, and this provided a scope of protection that obviated
the need for generic claims, according to Commissioner Hall. 75
Implicit in this reasoning is an understanding that design patent
protection extends beyond the precise subject matter disclosed (albeit just
barely),76 coupled with a judgment that it would be preferable to await ex
post judicial determinations of the scope of protection, rather than
charging designers with the obligation to define it ex ante through
claims. 77 This, of course, is notable as another instance of design patent
exceptionalism. Utility patent law does not rely exclusively on
infringement doctrines to calibrate the permissible scope of protection,
but instead operates through the combined work of infringement and
enablement, using enablement to answer how much extrapolation beyond
the scope of the disclosed embodiments is permissible. Design patent law
charted a different path, placing faith primarily in the infringement
standard.
Commissioner Hall also expressed the view that if genus claims
were routinely allowable in design patents, designers would invariably
attempt to lay claim to designs that they had yet to conceive. 78 Such a
view seems to proceed from the premise that only that which is explicitly
disclosed can be deemed to have been conceived for purposes of design
patent protection. Moreover, it reveals that at this time there was no clear
conception of the design patent's subject matter or the extent to which it
might extend beyond its disclosure.
The resistance to plural claiming also links to debates about the
unitary nature of design subject matter-whether a design must be
understood as an inseparable combination of the whole, or whether it can
74. 81 U.S. 511, 522-23 (1871).
75. Gerard, 1888 Dec. Comm'r Pat. at 41, 46; Exparte Gerard (Gerard I1), 1888 Dec. Comm'r
Pat. 49, 50; SIMONDS, supra note 67, at 198-99 (asserting that Gorham gives a design patent claim
"all the generic effect it can have," such that permitting genus claims in design patents would "seem
not advisable").
76. For cases restricting design patent scope to the scope of the preferred embodiments,
irrespective of the presence of genus claims, see Frank v. Hess, 84 F. 170, 170 (E.D. Pa. 1897)
(asserting that "[t]he monopoly must be confined to the particular design described and shown");
Conde v. Valkenburgh, 39 F. 788, 789 (N.D.N.Y. 1889) (questioning the validity of a design patent
claim that was not limited to the particular design shown in the drawings).
77. See also Ex parte Hess & Hess, 1891 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 142, 143 (asserting that allowing
design patent applicants to engage in an elaborate claiming practice would create "hopeless
confusion" at the Patent Office by forcing it to take on the function of the courts).
78. Gerard, 1888 Dec. Comm'r Pat. at 46.
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be disaggregated into subsidiary components, any of which might also
qualify as a design (and be claimed as such). The Patent Office had
struggled with this issue, periodically rejecting claims 79 to specific design
elements when those elements were not distinct or "segregable" enough
from the underlying design, 80 or requiring that divisional applications be
filed when those elements were so distinct and segregable from the other
elements that they failed to produce a unified design.81
Other rationales were also in play. By shifting from multiple
claiming towards a regime based on visual information, the Patent Office
may have hoped to simplify assessments of design patent scope (by
inducing reliance on the drawings) and may have sought to reduce the
administrative burdens associated with prosecution of complex design
patent documents.82
Regardless of the merits of these positions, plural claiming (along
with the use of genus claims) had all but vanished from design patents
by the turn of the century. In 1897, the Patent Office updated its rules to
encourage pro forma claiming, expressly recommending that "the claim
may properly be, in the broadest form, for the design, substantially as
shown and described."8 3 The following year, in Ex parte Wiessner, the
Patent Office ruled that claims purporting to encompass multiple species
of designs would not be permitted in design patents.8 4 Wiessner echoed
79. Exparte Coe, 1897 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 187, 188 (upholding the examiner's claim rejection;
reasoning that "[w]hen an inventor has produced a design, he has produced a single shape or
configuration and not a duality or plurality of such shapes or configurations"). The Office sometimes
applied this same analysis to require changes to the drawings. See Exparte Hill & Renner, 1898 Dec.
Comm'r Pat. 38, 38-39 (requiring the applicant to remove one of the figures, confirming "that the
doctrine of genus and species does not apply to design cases," and reasoning that "[w]hen an inventor
has produced a design, he has produced a single shape or configuration, not several"); Exparte Jenks,
1898 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 81, 82 (stating that "modifications of designs do not exist and should not be
shown and described in one patent, and the decisions of this Office require applicants to restrict their
drawings and description to one design, leaving out all reference to modifications").
80. See, e.g., Ex parte Bennett, 1891 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 100, 101 (endorsing the examiner's
segregability analysis where the subordinate claims to various rug design elements were
fragmentary); Ex parte Pope, 1883 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 74, 75 (affirming the examiner's rejection of a
claim to the upper portion of a seat-riser on the grounds that it was "not for a definite, segregable,
distinctive part of a design").
81. See, e.g., Exparte Patitz, 1883 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 101, 102 (finding no unity of design for a
mirror-frame and sconce); Ex parte Brower, 1873 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 151, 151-52 (same, for an
inkstand and stopper).
82. See Patitz, 1883 Dec. Comm'r Pat. at 102 (noting that permitting multiple claiming would
"confuse and cripple the classification established for the proper and orderly administration of the
business of the [Patent] Office").
83. 1897 RULES, supra note 42, Rule 81.
84. 1898 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 236, 242. For many decades, the Patent Office limited design patent
applicants to a single claim. The C.C.P.A. eventually endorsed this practice. In re Rubinfield, 270
F.2d 391, 395-96 (C.C.P.A. 1959).
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one of Commissioner Hall's rationales from Gerard: designers might use
such claims to attempt to capture designs that they had not invented.8 5
After Wiessner, plural claiming ended for design patents.8 6 Our
data reflects as much. Of the 162 design patents that we sampled in 1898,
only four (2.47%) contained more than one claim, and this is the last year
in our sample with any multi-claim design patents.8 7 But the debate over
how far a designer should be allowed to extrapolate from the disclosed
design has never been put to rest.
C. Towards Visual Disclosure
As the Patent Office successively minimized the design patent
document's allowable verbal elements in the latter part of the nineteenth
century, the exercise of disclosing a design became predominantly one of
conveying visual information through the document's figures. The figures
would need to serve as the chief vehicle for providing notice to the public
of the protected subject matter, the chief vehicle for demonstrating
compliance with disclosure and definiteness requirements, and the only
remaining aspect of the document allowing for the deployment of creative
drafting techniques for establishing scope.
Not surprisingly, drafting practices concerning design patent
illustrations changed substantially during this time period, probably to
accommodate the newly prominent roles that illustrations needed to play,
although other motivations were also present. One shift related to the
medium used for the illustrations: in the 1870s and early 1880s, it was
relatively common for design patent applications to use photographs (and
related formats), but this practice ended abruptly in 1891, when the
Patent Office promulgated rules providing that applicants could only use
photographs if the nature of the subject matter necessitated them;
otherwise, drawings were to be used.88 The Patent Office also instituted
several other costly requirements for the use of photographs, citing the
85. Wiessner, 1898 Dec. Comm'r Pat. at 238.
86. Instead, the Patent Office recommended that applicants use drawings showing the design
"in its simplest form,"-i.e., "the genus stripped of additions." Feder v. Poyet, 1899 Dec. Comm'r Pat.
218, 220-221.
87. Of the 9201 design patents in our sample issued after 1898, each contained only one claim.
See also WILLIAM L. SYMONS, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR DESIGNS 89 (1914) (asserting that Wiessner
had eliminated the multiple claiming practice).
88. U.S. PATENT OFFICE, RULES OF PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT OFFICE, Rule 83
(1891) [hereinafter 1891 RULES] (stating that the examiner could recommend the use of a photograph
if the design could not "properly be represented" by a drawing); see also Ex parte Poole, 1892 Dec.
Comm'r Pat. 233, 234 (ruling that whether the applicant could rely on a photograph was a matter of
the Office's discretion); 1891 RULES, supra, Rules 54, 55 (authorizing the Office to discard
photographs and create replacement drawings for a fee).
20161 1649
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
need to ensure uniform reproduction. 89 Even apart from these new
administrative hurdles, it stands to reason that applicants would have
shifted away from photographs as the basis for their design patent
disclosures, because the use of drawings provides the opportunity for at
least modest control over scope, while photographs might incorporate
details not necessary to the visual impression that the design is intended
to protect.
Our empirical analysis supports the shift in practice. Indeed,
Figure 4-which plots the annual share of patents that relied on
drawings, instead of photographs, and omits years with fewer than
twenty-five observations-demonstrates that patentees relied almost
exclusively on drawings after the Patent Office's rule changes in 1891.
PT(RE 4: ANNITAT, SHARE OF PATENTS WTTH DRAWTNS (VERSTS PHOTOGPRAPHS)
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Perhaps it is even more surprising that our data shows that design
patent applicants relied so heavily on photographic illustrations prior to
the 1891 rule changes.
In addition to the sharp swing towards the use of drawings, there
were other indications of the rising sensitivity about the nature and
89. 1891 RULES, supra note 88, Rule 84 (requiring special mounting and more copies than for
drawings).
1650 [Vol. 69:6:1631
DISCLOSING DESIGNS
content of the disclosed visual information in design patent documents.
For example, conflict arose over whether the drawings depicting designs
for surface ornamentation must depict the precise articles of manufacture
on which the surface ornamentation was applied, 90 a requirement that
might have significantly narrowed the scope of protection for a number of
design patents. 91 The Patent Office eventually declined to impose such a
requirement, instead permitting applicants to rely on generic references
to the article of manufacture in the verbal disclosure (e.g., in the pro
forma claim). 92
Having been denied the opportunity to draft claim sets in the style
of utility patents, applicants attempted to recalibrate design patent scope
visually by incorporating dotted lines in their drawings to designate
design features they viewed as unimportant, leaving the essential
features in solid lines. 93 The Patent Office initially insisted that these
features still formed part of the design, 94 but later allowed applicants to
use dotted lines to designate features that were physically present but
were not to be taken into account in forming an overall visual impression
of the claimed design. 95
Other conflicts arose over matters of minutiae in the drawings,
such as the use of shading techniques 96 and the use of views that seemed
to be directed at conveying mechanical function, rather than visual
appearance, to the consumer (e.g., cross-sectional views in some
circumstances). 97 These issues took on exaggerated significance in a
system that relied so heavily on visual information to establish scope, but
90. See Jason J. Du Mont & Mark D. Janis, Virtual Designs, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 107, 114-
21 (2013) (synthesizing the relevant decisions).
91. See Ex parte Cady, 1916 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 57, 61-62 ("[U]ntil some court has definitely
spoken [on this requirement] it will be safer and, I think, more proper for the applicant to state in
his specification that his design is to be used as the figure of an enumerated number of articles of
commerce.").
92. See, e.g., Ex parte Andrews, 1917 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 13, 14; Ex parte Fulda, 1913 Dec.
Comm'r Pat. 206, 209.
93. See, e.g., Exparte Adams, 1898 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 109, 110.
94. Id.
95. See, e.g., Exparte Quinzburg, 1925 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 159, 159 (involving a boundary line).
96. See, e.g., Ex parte Kohler, 1905 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 165, 165 (requiring surface shading in
lines instead of stippling patterns). But see Ex parte Bryant, 1916 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 36, 36
(permitting stippling).
97. See, e.g., Ex parte Kohler, 1905 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 192, 192 (requiring that the drawings
"illustrate the design as it will appear to purchasers and users"); Ex parte Weihman, 1905 Dec.
Comm'r Pat. 437, 438 (rejecting the use of a panoramic view for displaying a thimble on the ground
that it might imply the equivalent of utility patent protection).
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they also reflected other considerations, such as administrative efficiency
and proscriptions against protecting functional features. 98
Perhaps the most prominent indicator of the shift to visual
information is the increasing volume of figures observed in design patents
during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 99 As depicted
by the linear trend line in Figure 5 below, after the turn of the century-
following the Patent Office's adoption of the requirement for a single pro
forma claim and its efforts to cut down on the contents of the written
description-we found evidence in our data that applicants began using
more figures in their design patents.
FIGURE 5: ANNUAL AVERAGE NUMBER OF FIGURES
II I 1 1
1866 1876 1886 1896 1906
Year Granted
1916 1926 1936
This trend may be easier to visualize in Figure 6, which depicts
the share of design patents containing more than one figure. 100
98. Eventually, the Patent Office adopted a more deferential approach to cross-sectional views.
See, e.g., Exparte Lohmann, 1912 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 336, 337 (allowing the use of a cross-sectional
view of a tire tread design).
99. We recognize that the number of drawing figures in a design patent might also be affected
by other factors, such as the nature of the subject matter.
100. The sharp drop in the early 1900s, interrupting what otherwise would have been a general
increase from the early 1870s forward, may be a product of the implementation of the ornamentality
requirement and the development of a restriction practice requiring applicants to split up
applications that contained multiple distinct designs.
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FIGURE 6: ANNUAL SHARE OF PATENTS WITH MORE THAN ONE FIGURE
100% -
1866 1876 188~3 1896 1906
Year Granted
1916 1926 1936
In sum, our empirical work complements our historical analysis
and provides evidence that design patentees at one time adopted
disclosure techniques traditionally associated with utility patent
practice. By the turn of the century, however, this practice had been
significantly curtailed. We do not detect any single motivating influence
explaining this shift from verbal to visual. Moreover, we see little
evidence that either the courts or the Patent Office were cognizant of the
difficulties that lay ahead in reconfiguring utility patent doctrine for an
era of visual information. Nor do we find any indication of any conscious
effort to reimagine the role to be played by a predominantly visual
disclosure and how that might connect to the basic notion of the patent
bargain.
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II. DESIGN PATENT DISCLOSURES IN
THE MODERN ERA OF VISUAL INFORMATION
Once design patent law shifted to a practice of predominantly
visual disclosure, it never returned to the more heterogeneous approach
of the prior era. Yet modern design patent law has failed to develop native
standards that reflect a coherent notion of the role that visual disclosure
is to play or a coherent notion of what constitutes a protected "design."
Instead, it has borrowed ad hoe from utility patent jurisprudence, with
little regard for the quandaries that arise when utility patent rhetoric is
inserted into the visual inquiries of design patent law.
In this Part, we analyze three doctrinal contexts in which
disclosure issues appear in modern design patent law. First, where "the
overall appearance of the design is unclear" from the disclosure, the
requirements of definiteness under § 112(b) and enablement under
§ 112(a) may be implicated. 10 1 Second, where the drawings have been
amended during prosecution in a manner that lacks antecedent support
in the application as originally filed-or in the priority document if there
is a claim to priority-an issue of compliance with the § 112(a) written
description requirement may arise. 10 2 Third, where the disclosure
combines multiple designs that are deemed to be distinct from each other,
the PTO may require the applicant to divide the disclosure into separate
applications as part of the prosecution process. 103 While the PTO and the
courts have attempted to articulate pragmatic rules to govern these
scenarios, those rules rely too heavily on utility patent rhetoric and lack
a core conception of what it means to claim intellectual property rights
visually.
A. The Enabled (and Definite) Design
Utility patent law requires that the patentee's disclosure enable
the practice of the claimed invention 10 4 and that the claims to that
invention be definite. 10 5 The requirements are separate-and the 1952
Act was structured to encourage the distinction. 10 6 Enablement regulates
101. MPEP, supra note 8, §1504.04; infra Part II.A.
102. See infra Part II.B.
103. See infra Part II.C.
104. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012).
105. 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) (2012); Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2128-
31 (2014) (establishing the test for definiteness); see John R. Allison & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, How
Courts Adjudicate Patent Definiteness and Disclosure, 65 DUKE L.J. 609, 609-96 (2016) (assessing
utility patent cases involving enablement, the written description requirement, and definiteness).
106. See P.J. Federico, Com mentary on theew Patent Act, reprinted in 75 J. PAT. & TRADEMAR K
OFF. SOCY 161, 186 (1993) (explaining that the disclosure requirements and the definiteness
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the relationship between the disclosure and the claims, serving "the dual
function in the patent system of ensuring adequate disclosure of the
claimed invention and of preventing claims broader than the disclosed
invention." 10 7 The enablement requirement demands that" '[t]he scope of
the claims must be less than or equal to the scope of the enablement' to
Iensure that the public knowledge is enriched by the patent specification
to a degree at least commensurate with the scope of the claims.' "108 It
calls for an assessment as to whether a person of ordinary skill in the art,
relying on the disclosure, can make and use the invention as claimed
without "undue experimentation." 10 9 Definiteness focuses on whether the
claim language, understood in view of the disclosure (and, conceivably,
extrinsic evidence), provides adequate notice of what is claimed. 110 Under
the Nautilus standard, "[A] patent is invalid for indefiniteness if its
claims, read in light of the specification delineating the patent, and the
prosecution history, fail to inform, with reasonable certainty, those
skilled in the art about the scope of the invention."111
Little of this translates neatly to modern design patent law. While
the design patent document is primarily visual, the enablement and
definiteness inquiries in utility patent law rely largely on linguistic
analysis. Whereas the claim is the disclosure in the design patent
document, the claim is inherently presumed to be distinct from the
disclosure in the utility patent law's enablement and definiteness tests. 112
The PTO and the courts have not dealt with these deeper problems
head on. Instead, they have largely gotten by through the simple artifice
of combining the enablement and indefiniteness analyses, reasoning that
because the required pro forma claim incorporates the disclosure,
requiremenI were placed in separate paragraphs or § 1 12 to "emphasize the distinction between the
description and the claim").
107. MagSil Corp. v. Hitachi Glob. Storage Techs., Inc., 687 F.3d 1377, 1380-81 (Fed. Cir. 2012);
see also Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REV. 123, 123-76 (2006)
(questioning the theoretical and practical bases for the teaching function of enablement, and arguing
that enablement is an inquiry into possession).
108. Sitrick v. Dreamworks, LLC, 516 F.3d 993, 999 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting Nat'l Recovery
Techs., Inc. v. Magnetic Separation Sys., Inc., 166 F.3d 1190, 1195-96 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
109. See In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (listing factors to be weighed in
determining whether experimentation was undue).
110. The claim construction inquiry serves similar objectives. See Media Rights Techs., Inc. v.
Capital One Fin. Grp., Inc., 800 F.3d 1366, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (noting that claim construction and
indefiniteness issues may be "intertwined").
111. Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2124 (2014). Previously, the
Federal Circuit had confined definiteness challenges to cases in which the claim language was
"insolubly ambiguous." See, e.g., Datamize, LLC v. Plumtree Software, Inc., 417 F.3d 1342, 1347
(Fed. Cir. 2005).
112. Enablement regulates scope by relating the claims to the disclosure. Definiteness analysis
calls for the claims to be read in light of the disclosure.
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any determination of the scope of protection sought by the claim is also a determination of
the subject matter that must be enabled by the disclosure. Hence, if the appearance and
shape or configuration of the design for which protection is sought cannot be determined or
understood due to an inadequate visual disclosure, then the claim, which incorporates the
visual disclosure, fails to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter the
inventor(s) regard as their invention ... Furthermore, such disclosure fails to enable a
designer of ordinarv skill in the art to make an article having the shape and appearance of
the design for which protection is sought. 113
This approach has generated relatively little controversy in
modern design patent litigation. The few reported decisions that present
enablement/definiteness issues generally involve significant drafting
errors. For example, the verbal disclosure in a design patent (limited
though it may be) might include language that conflicts with the
drawings.11 4 The drawings may be incomplete11 5 or, as in the case of the
bedspring design shown in cross-section below, arguably
incomprehensible. 116
113. MPEP, supra note 8, § 1504.04.
114. See, e.g., Eclectic Prods., Inc. v. Painters Prods., Inc., No. 6:13-CV-02181-AA, 2015 WL
930045, at *3 (D. Or. Mar. 2, 2015) (invalidating design patent where claim referred to an "applicator
cap" but drawings omitted any cap, an inconsistency that created "uncertainty about the claim's
meaning" and resulted in a failure "to provide notice of what is claimed").
115. See, e.g., Philco Corp. v. Admiral Corp., 199 F. Supp. 797, 799-807 (D. Del. 1961) (finding
disclosure inadequate where drawings of television cabinet did not show the back of the cabinet).
116. See James E. Tompkins Co. v. N.Y. Woven Wire Mattress Co., 159 F. 133, 133-35 (2d Cir.
1907) (invalidating the patent on prior art grounds but noting that the drawings might present an
indefiniteness problem because it was unclear whether the relative number or the dimensions of the
stripes would change when the design as depicted was scaled up for actual use); see also Seed
Lighting Design Co. v. Home Depot, No. C 04-2291 SBA, 2005 WL 1868152, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 3,
2005) (finding an indefiniteness problem where inventor himself testified he could not tell from
drawings whether the base depicted in the drawings was a flat disk or rounded dome).
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Or the drawings may be inconsistent with one another-an
assertion that the court accepted in a case involving the lamp designs
shown below (Figure 8).17
117. Seed Lighting Design Co., 2005 WL 1868152, at *8-9 (granting the defendant's summary
judgment for invalidity on a combination of enablement and indefiniteness grounds). In addition to
the ambiguities in the drawings of the base-as shown in Figure 8-the court also found
discrepancies with other drawings that related to the shades and disk situated above the rods. Cf.
Weber-Stephen Prods. LLC v. Sears Holding Corp., 145 F. Supp. 3d 793, 795-806 (2015) (noting
inconsistencies in the drawings but declining to grant a motion for summary judgment on
indefiniteness); Times Three Clothier, LLC v. Spanx, Inc., No. 13 Civ. 2157(DIC), 2011 WL 1688130,
at *7-9 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 29, 2014) (invalidating two design patents for indefiniteness where a
rea sonable jury could find that, the in consistent features in the draw in gs were i nconsequlent al to the
overall impression of the design).
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Showing Discrepancies in the Lamp's Base (flat or domed)
Perhaps these are easy cases on their facts, but they leave
underlying conceptual questions unresolved. Some are formal questions,
such as whether it is possible to speak meaningfully about a "disclosure"
enabling a "claim" when the claim expressly incorporates the disclosure.
A number of decisions-some quite old-demonstrate that the
ambiguities of the enablement/definiteness requirements allow abundant
room for arguments that seem to have little to do with the adequacy of
the disclosure, instead reflecting questions about subject matter
eligibility and early obviousness requirements. 11 8
For example, in F. G. & W. F. Niedringhaus, 119 the applicants had
claimed a pattern that allegedly imparted a "beautifully-mottled
appearance representing granite" to enameled iron ware.1 20 The
application included a photograph that evidently only showed the
"outline" of the design and a written description that attempted to explain
that the applicants had created a design "of ornament or pattern, to be
118. See supra notes 49-67 and accompanying text (making a similar observation about cases
that nominally address the propriety of verbal disclosures in design patents).
119. F. G. & W. F. Niedringhaus, 1875 Dec. Commr Pat. 22.
120. Id.
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printed, painted, or otherwise placed on or worked into the various
articles of enameled iron ware made and sold by us." 121 The
Commissioner upheld the examiner's rejection for a defective
disclosure, 122 but his analysis questioned the "patentability" of applying
a peculiar granite-like color through an ordinary enameling process to
iron ware, a rationale that may reflect qualms about subject matter
eligibility or obviousness. 123
Some cases decided near the beginning of the modern era of visual
disclosures reflect similar ambiguities. In Stirling, 124 the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals ("C.C.P.A.") affirmed the Patent Office's
rejection of a claim to a wallpaper design that had been created by
creasing the paper, filling the creases with ink, and then photographing
and moving the paper successively to achieve a desired eftect. 125 The court
reasoned that it would be "a virtual impossibility" for persons of ordinary
skill to reproduce the design exactly, even if they followed the precise
process that the designer had used. 126 Although this is the modern
rhetoric of enablement (and/or indefiniteness), 127 the rejection that the
C.C.P.A. was affirming was for "lack of patentable invention," 128 a
formulation that could be understood as a theory of subject matter
eligibility 129 or of patentability over the prior art.
In another case involving a wallpaper design, shown below in
Figure 9,130 the court invalidated the design patent in suit on the ground
that the design was not capable of reproduction if construed to encompass
any wallpaper produced by the designer's method and having "a cloud
effect of visionary depth." 131
121. Id.
122. Id. at 23 (expressing dismay that the disclosure was so "clearly deficient" as to requirements
for "clearness, exactness, and particularity," and asserting that compliance with those requirements
was especially important for designs, "which must of necessity be something fixed and determined").
123. See In re Niedringhaus' Application, 2 MacArth. 149, 155-57 (D.C. 1875) (on appeal from
lower court's rejection of patent application, emphasizing obviousness).
124. In re Stirling, 18 C.C.P.A. 1071, 1071-75 (1931).
125. Id. at 1072.
126. Id. at 1074.
127. See also In re Shetterly, 18 C.C.P.A. 1169, 1171 (1931) (invoking Stirling; concluding that
the design at issue was not "definite" because reproducing it would be "difficult, if not impossible").
128. Stirling, 18 C.C.P.A. at 1072.
129. Id. at 1074 (commenting that the design "resulted haphazardly from certain movements or
operat ions purely mechanical in their nature"). Alternatively, one might argue that the language
invokes the principle of possession, which might tie to the written description requirement. Id. at
1073-75 (questioning whether there had been a conception in the patent law sense).
130. Harmon Paper Co. v. Kimberly Clark Co., 289 F. 501, 501-09 (E.D. Wis. 1922).
131. Id. at 508.
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One could read this as a case about the commensurate scope
problem-i.e., disclosure was not enabling because an ordinary designer
could not have produced at least a representative number of designs
within the broad asserted scope of the claim. But the court's language
suggests an alternative rationale: a concern that the patentee was
attempting to capture an entire design style through an impermissibly
broad construction. 132 This doctrinal ambivalence matters if it betrays
uncertainty about the animating principles, as we think it might.
Even if taken at face value as enablement/indefiniteness
decisions, these cases leave unanswered a tricky overarching question:
What exactly should a design patent disclosure enable an ordinary
designer to make? Early decisions suggested that design patentees might
be required to disclose the article that was associated with the design in
Sufficient detail "to enable those skilled in the art, to make the ar/icle
without being fbrced to resort to conjecture." 133 But this would seem to
suggest that (1) a design patent's disclosure is directed to persons having
ordinary skill in manufacturing the article (whereas it is accepted that
the disclosure is directed to the ordinary designer) 134 and (2) that
132. Id. (worrying that design patentees might appropriate the "mahogany effect" of stained
woodwork, the "stippling" effect of wall painting, and many other design effects). In utility patent
cases, the written description requirement sometimes has been invoked to strike down claims to mere
concepts. See infra Part 1I.B. (discussing how that requirement applies to designs).
133. Ex parte Salsbury, 38 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 149 (Com'r Pat. & Trademarks 1938) (emphasis
added); see also Ex part Saunders, 119 I .S.P.Q- (BNA) 258 (Pat. B3d. App. 1958) (commenting that
a design patent application must give an enabling disclosure ol the "coniguration amd appe'rance of
the article," but reversing the rejection on the ground thait the disclosure was adequate).
134. See, e.g., MPEP, supra note 8, § 1504.04 (referring to a "designer of ordinary skill").
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disclosure must contain whatever technical teachings the ordinary
artisan would require in order to manufacture the article.
Indeed, the Board's decision in Exparte Sweenwey 3 5 may illustrate
the consequences of pursuing such an approach. The rejected design
patent application at issue discosed a marleized pittern appied to tiles,
and, like many of the other cases discussed in this Section, the Board
affirmed on the ground that the disclosed design was incapable of being
exactly reproduced.136 But the pattern surely could have been
photographed and replicated.137 The Board's problem was that ordinary
artisans familiar with "floor tile forming procedures and tile laying
practices" would be unable to "carry out the disclosed pattern," because
the pattern was a matter of "random occurrence" that did "not repeat even
within the numerous tiles" shown in the drawings, and the tile alignment
was also so "random" that "[n]o floor laid in such fashion would exactly
duplicate the pattern."138
To the extent that cases like Sweeney suggest that design patents
should be subjected to an enablement-to-make analysis that extends to
making the associated article, those cases are surely wrong. They
heedlessly equate design patent disclosures with those of utility patents,
squarely contrary to the established modern norm that design patent
disclosures are meant to convey only visual information.1 39 Indeed,
virtually no modern design patent disclosure-e.g., for car body designs,
mobile phones, household appliances-would be likely to survive such a
standard.
There is no indication that the courts or the PTO are poised to
adopt a technical enablement-to-make standard. The law has moved in
the opposite direction. For some types of designs, the PTO no longer
requires that applicants even depict the appearance of the associated
article.140 Partial claiming is also permitted. 141 The lesson of Sweeney is
largely negative: enablement-to-make, applied to design patents, cannot
reasonably mean enablement to make the associated article.
The enable-to-make standard in the visual era could mean that
the designer must disclose the technique used to achieve the design's
appearance. But this, too, may be problematic. Suppose that a designer
135. 123 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 506, 1959 WL 6354 (B.P.A.I. 1959).
136. Id. at *3.
137. The patentee had so argued, but the Board complained that the patentee could not say
which area was to be taken as representative of the claimed design. Id.
138. Id.
139. See supra notes 4-10 and accompanying text (analyzing cases that actually forbid the
inclusion of the same technical details that cases like Sweeney seemed to demand).
140. See Du Mont & Janis, supra note 90, at 114-21.
141. MPEP, supra note 8, § 1503.02.
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claims a novel rug pattern design. Must the designer disclose details
about the weaving technique that renders the novel appearance? Design
patents, restricted as they are to visual information, tend to disclose no
such details, and we know of no modern case requiring any such
disclosure.
In sum, enablement/indefiniteness should not be dismissed as a
(lead letter in modern design patent law. The modern cases leave higher-
level questions unanswered, and the reliance on utility patent rhetoric
generates ambiguities. The problem here is a common one in design
patent law: utility patent rhetoric has been borrowed without careful
attention to the differences between utility patent disclosures and design
patent disclosures. The enablement-to-rnake standard, applied
vigorously, would risk inviting the PTO and the courts to require
disclosure of detailed technical information in the service of a teaching
function that design patent disclosures are not intended to perform.
While we know of neither judges nor patent examiners who seem poised
to deploy such a standard, its presence in the case law should give us
pause about whether the role of the disclosure in design patents is well
understood.
B. The Described Design
In utility patent law, the enablement and written description
requirements overlap in some cases,1 42 but the Federal Circuit has
concluded that the two requirements are separate.1 43 Like the
enablement requirement, the written description requirement regulates
scope: it plays "a vital role in curtailing claims ... that have not been
invented, and thus cannot be described." 1 44 The "essence" of the written
description requirement, the Federal Circuit has said, "is that a patent
applicant, as part of the bargain with the public, must describe his or her
invention so that the public will know what it is and that he or she has
truly made the claimed invention."1 45 Subsumed within this scope-
regulating function of the disclosure (or at least closely related to it) is
the role of the disclosure in policing possession-the disclosure must
demonstrate to persons of ordinary skill in the art that the inventor was
in possession of the claimed invention as of the application date. 146
142. Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc).
143. Id. at 1344 (ruling that § 112 contains separate enablement and written description
requirements).
144. Id. at 1352.
145. Abbvie Deutschland GmbH & Co., KG v. Janssen Biotech, Inc., 759 F.3d 1285, 1298 (Fed.
Cir. 2014).
146. Vasudevan Software, Inc. v. MicroStrategy, Inc., 782 F.3d 671, 683 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
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Like enablement/indefiniteness, the written description
requirement might seem to be a fringe issue in modern design patent law,
but when it does arise, it seems bereft of any coherent animating
principle. The written description requirement has surfaced in design
patent cases only in the context of drawing amendments that are alleged
to imperil claims to priority. The leading decision is In re Daniels. 147 The
applicant had claimed a design for a "leecher" 148 adorned with leaf
ornamentation as shown below (left), in an application filed on the
inventor's behalf by the American Inventors Corporation. 149 While the
application was pending, the FTC charged American Inventors with
operating a deceptive invention promotion scheme, alleging that
American Inventors systematically filed design patent applications on
utility patent subject matter without informing their clients of the
differences between the regimes, often adding decorative matter to the
disclosed subject matter to facilitate allowance.5 0 Daniels evidently
became aware of this and retained new patent counsel, and the new
lawyer filed a second application depicting the leecher design without the
leaf ornamentation, as shown below (right),15 1 and designated the second
application a continuation of the first. Daniels apparently needed to rely
on the filing date of the parent application in order to avoid intervening
prior art,1 52 and this presented a written description issue: Did the
drawings in the parent application including the leaf ornamentation
provide written description support for the drawings in the child
application, which lacked the ornamentation?
147. 144 F.3d 1452 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
148. Evidently a device for trapping leeches. Id. at 1454.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 1454-55.
152. Id. at 1455.
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FIGURE 10: DRAWINGS FROM U.S. DESIGN PATENT APPLICATIONS
SERIAL Nos. 07/902,055 AND 29/020,787
The Federal Circuit held that it did. The court viewed the test for
sufficiency of the written description as "the same, whether for a design
or a utility patent," 153 although that could only be true at a relatively high
level of generality. According to the court, the written description inquiry
for design patents was "sim-ply to determine whether the inventor had
possession at the earlier date of what was claimed at the later (late," and
this was to be carried out by looking at what was visible in the drawings,
because it was the drawings of the design patent "that provide the
description." 154
The court then applied its visibility test-with extraordinary
generosity. The "article of manufacture" (by which the court apparently
meant the body of the leecher) was "clearly visible in the earlier design
application," the court concluded.155 The leaf ornamentation did not
"1obscure the design of the leecher, all details of which are visible in the
drawings of the earlier application." 156 It seemed important to the court
that the change to the drawings involved surface ornamentation; it gave
the court a basis for saying that the "leaf design" was a "mere indicium"
that did not "override the underlying design.9157 Thus, according to the
153. Id. at 1456.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 1456-57.
156. Id. at 1457.
157. Id.
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court, the drawings in the parent application demonstrated to the
hypothetical designer of ordinary skill that, as of the parent application's
filing date, Daniels had possession of "the later claimed design of that
article." 158
In current design patent law, the major doctrinal issue
surrounding the written description requirement is whether to take the
Daniels visibility test seriously as precedent. It might reasonably be read
as a test of general application (reinforcing the message that § 112
compliance is a casual matter for design patents); as a test limited to the
curious instance of amendments that remove superficial surface
ornamentation from shape or configuration claims; 159 or as a case that
should merely be written off as a judicial response to an especially
sympathetic plaintiff. While the virtual absence of other significant
decisions on the written description requirement for design patents has
rendered the Daniels test the de facto foundation for analysis, it is not
clear that Daniels has permanently put to rest other, potentially more
aggressive approaches to the written description requirement, and
sentiment in favor of such approaches periodically has manifested itself
in case law and PTO proposals.
One such approach rests on the idea that design subject matter is
unitary. It is taken as axiomatic that "[a] design claim covers the entire
design as a whole" and that this protection "does not extend to any
individual part or portion thereof." 160 The Daniels test, at least as applied
in Daniels itself, arguably takes some liberties with the notion of unitary
design by shrugging off the disappearing leaf ornamentation as "mere
indicium."
While this is troubling, pressing the unitary design thesis to its
ultimate extreme is also troubling. If design is truly unitary, then it might
seem that any change to a drawing might implicate the written
description requirement. According to the Federal Circuit in Daniels, it
was just this sort of extreme reasoning that had animated the Board's
decision, and that required reversal. 161
158. Id. The court also said that the subject matter of the later application is common to that of
the earlier application, id., but this seems to us more a conclusion than a rationale.
159. The MPEP endorses Daniels but also attempts to derive a general rule from it that
juxtaposes undefined concepts of the "appearance" of a design and a design's "configuration": "An
amendment which alters the appearance of the claimed design by removing two-dimensional,
superimposed surface treatment may be permitted if it is clear friom the application that applicant
had possession of the underlying configuration of the design without the surface treatment at the
time of filing of the application." MPEP, supra note 8, § 1504.04.
160. MPEP, supra note 8, § 1504.05; see KeyStone Retaining Wall Sys., Inc. v. Westrock, Inc.,
997 F.2d 1444, 1450 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (rejecting claim for infringement).
161. Daniels, 144 F.3d at 1457.
20161 1665
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
Yet in a prior case, Salmon, 162 the Federal Circuit had seemed to
lean heavily on the notion of unitary design to explain why an applicant's
claim to priority was defeated by a failure to comply with the written
description requirement. In Salmon, the Federal Circuit had rejected an
applicant's assertion that its claimed design for a stool having a round
seat could trace priority back to an earlier application showing a stool
design having exactly the same features, except with a square seat. 163
The drawings from the later application are shown below:
FIGURE 11: DRAWINGS FROM U.S. DESIGN PATENT No. D234,101
The court explained that the stool design claimed in the later
application was not the "same design" as that claimed in the first
application. 164 The court said that "[n]othing in the text of the application
or the attached drawings even intimated that the square shape of the seat
was not an integral element" of the design being claimed in the first
application, nor did the text or drawings suggest that "the design
consisted of only the tubular portion of the stool and not the seat."165
Substituting any other seat shape for the round shape constituted an
162. In re Salmon, 705 F.2d 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
163. Id. at 1582. The patentee had sought to have the second patent reissued to incorporate the
claim to priority. Id. at 1580.
164. Id. at 1581-82. Both seat shapes had been depicted in solid lines, unfortunately for the
applicant. See infra notes 173-174 and accompanying text for further discussion of the issue of
partial claiming.
165. Salmon, 705 F.2d at 1581.
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impermissible change of "configuration," the court declared. 166 The court
rejected the patentee's argument that the shape of the seat was
"immaterial" or that the round shape was a mere "obvious variation" over
the square. 167 The court reasoned that all elements of a design are
material because a design is a "unitary thing,"168 although it also said
that determining "whether particular differences in designs are
sufficiently significant to produce different designs is largely a matter of
aesthetics." 169
This drew a sharp dissent from Judge Nichols, who asserted that
"[t]here is no reason, except judicial fiat, why a design, even if largely a
matter of aesthetics, should not allow [for] immaterial variations." 170
According to Judge Nichols, "The court is treating design as a mysterious
black art it cannot understand, and will not learn, so cosmic significance
may lurk in variations that would be irrelevant and immaterial to a
tutored eye. If design is thus unknowable, design patents should not be
litigated in judicial tribunals." 171
The Daniels court was aware of Salmon and attempted to
distinguish it, albeit in entirely conclusory terms. 172 And perhaps there
are ways to harmonize Salmon with Daniels or otherwise to minimize the
effect of Salmon on the Daniels visibility test. One might argue that
Salmon is an example of the rare situation in which the original drawing
fails the visibility test. By virtually ignoring the ordinary designer as the
interpretative lens for the analysis, perhaps the court in Salmon viewed
Daniels as accommodating only the subtraction of minor visual elements
from the drawings (i.e., where the addition or substitution of almost any
visible element fails). Relatedly, one might point out that Salmon could
be read as a story of applicant error concerning the conceptualization of
the design-the applicant should have originally rendered the stool seat
in broken lines to the extent that the design inheres only in the tubular
support portion, a practice sometimes referred to as partial claiming. 173
Indeed, the PTO has previously chosen to read Salmon in this manner,
as support for a general rule that "[a]n amendment that changes the
166. Id. (quoting the Board with approval).
167. The latter argument has been rejected in utility patent law. Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly
& Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc).
168. Salmon, 705 F.2d at 1582 (quoting In re Blum, 374 F.2d 904, 907 (C.C.P.A. 1967)).
169. Id.
170. Id. at 1583 (Nichols, J., dissenting).
171. Id.
172. In re Daniels, 144 F.3d 1452, 1457 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (merely reciting that the earlier
application did not provide a description of the later-claimed design).
173. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.152 (2016) ("Broken lines may be used to show visible environmental
structure ...."); In re Zahn, 617 F.2d 261 (C.C.P.A. 1980) (upholding the use of broken lines to show
unclaimed but visible aspects of a design).
20161 1667
1668 VANDERBILTLAWREVIEW [Vol. 69:6:1631
scope of a design by either reducing certain portions of the drawing to
broken lines or converting broken line structure to solid lines" does not
give rise to a written description problem because the "applicant was in
possession of everything disclosed in the drawing at the time the
application was filed and the mere reduction of certain portions to broken
lines or conversion of broken line structure to solid lines is not a departure
from the original disclosure." 174
On the other hand, Salmon could be seen as an exemplar of the
reliance on unitary design and thus as the antithesis of the Daniels case.
This is important because, notwithstanding Daniels, there have been
some indications that the PTO might breathe new life into the written
description requirement as applied to design patents. 175 In a public
presentation in 2014, a PTO design specialist seemed to call for a written
description requirement applicable to amended or later-added drawings
in design patent cases that would inquire broadly into whether the
"amended design looks different from the original," or whether the
amended design was "recognizable" by those of ordinary skill as the
original design. 176 The PTO had also issued a Request for Comments on
a new multi-factor approach for applying the written description
requirement in design patent matters, although the PTO emphasized
that the approach was intended to govern "rare" cases.177 After vocal
174. MPEP, supra note 8, § 1504.04.
175. The Federal Circuit's decision applying the written description requirement in In re Owens,
710 F.3d 1362, 1368-69 (Fed. Cir. 2013), should not be taken as indicative of a trend towards more
rigorous enforcement of the requirement, because Owens involves truly peculiar facts. In the case,
the Federal Circuit upheld the denial of a claim to priority based on the written description
requirement where the continuing application added a so-called "unclaimed boundary line" to the
drawings where there had been no indication of any such boundary in the original drawings. Id. The
case involved a design for a bottle, and the original drawings showed an undivided pentagonal front
panel, whereas the continuing application added a boundary line to mark off a trapezoidal top portion
of the front panel. Id. at 1368.
176. See Richard Stockton, The Written Description Requirement in US Design Patent
Prosecution: Background and Recent Developments, BANNER & WITCOFF (Mar. 12, 2014),
http://bannerwitcoff.com/_docs/library/articles/R. 20Stockton.Written o20Description o20Recent o
20Developmentso20ando20Summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/4SB9-3DBM]. Moreover, the
presentation seemed to suggest that amendments converting solid lines to broken lines (or vice versa)
were likely to change the overall appearance of the design, contrary to the view of Salmon taken in
the MPEP.
177. Request for Comments and Notice of Roundtable Event on the Written Description
Requirement for Design Applications, 79 Fed. Reg. 7,171, 7,172 (Feb. 4, 2014). The proposed factors
included:
(1) The presence of a common theme among the subset of elements forming the newly
identified design claim, such as a common appearance;
(2) the subset of elements forming the newly identified design claim share an operational
and/or visual connection due to the nature of the particular article of manufacture (e.g.,
set of tail lights of an automobile);
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critique, the PTO withdrew its first proposal and substituted a second, 178
discarding the formal multi-factor approach in favor of a "totality" of
considerations approach, where the considerations include: (1) what the
disclosure in the parent application (including drawings and any verbal
disclosure) "reasonably conveyed to an ordinary designer at the time of
the invention"; (2) "how an ordinary designer in the art would have
designed the article that is the subject of the design claim"; and (3) "the
nature and intended use of the article embodying the claimed design as
identified by the title or description." 1 79
Whether the second proposed test differs materially from the first
may be debated,180 but it is difficult to square either test with the
visibility test of Daniels. As a practical matter, that problem may be
confined to a narrow band of cases (at least according to the PTO's
pronouncements), but this movement on the written description
requirement is important for reasons that transcend the practical: it
exposes continuing uncertainty about how to relate the disclosure in a
design patent to the subject matter that design patents protect. In the
absence of progress towards refining the concept of the design to be
protected, the likelihood of extreme and unpredictable swings in the
application of the written description requirement to designs is
substantial.
C. Restriction Practice and the Concept of Embodiments of a Design
Restriction practice provides the final example of an effort to apply
utility patent rules to design disclosures. It yields yet additional rhetoric,
and potentially additional confusion, on what constitutes the protected
subject matter in a design patent.
(3) the subset of elements forming the newly identified design claim is a self-contained
design within the original design;
(4) a fundamental relationship among the subset of elements forming the newly identified
design claim is established by the context in which the elements appear; and/or
(5) the subset of elements forming the newly identified design claim gives the same overall
impression as the original design claim.
Id- The "rare" cases included only those in which the amended drawings were directed at some
subsidiary portion of the design depicted in the original drawings. Id.
178. See generally Request for Comments on the Application of the Written Description
Requirement to Specific Situations in Design Applications, 81 Fed. Reg. 22,233 (Apr. 8, 2016).
179. Id. at 22,236.
180. See, e.g., Am. Intellectual Prop. Law Ass'n, Comment Letter on Request for Comments on
the Application of the Written Description Requirement to Specific Situations in Design Applications,
U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. (June 14, 2016), http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
designcomments-a-aipla-14june2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/JXL9-URH2] (arguing that the second
test is objectionable for the same reasons as the first-it would increase uncertainty and cost, and
would induce applicants to "front load" design patent disclosures with large numbers of embodiments
to hedge against rigorous application of the written description requirement).
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Any given utility patent is to be directed to only a single invention.
But utility patents frequently disclose multiple embodiments of the
invention being claimed.181 This practice is permissible as long as the
disclosed embodiments are all directed to the same invention. If two or
more "independent and distinct" inventions are claimed in one
application, the PTO is authorized to require the applicant to split the
application into multiple pieces, each to be filed as an individual
application.182 The procedure is referred to as "restriction practice" and
exists to prevent applicants from bundling multiple inventions together
into one application as a strategy for avoiding filing fees. To determine
whether disclosed embodiments are directed to independent and distinct
inventions, the PTO determines (1) whether there is any disclosed
relationship between them in design, operation, and effect (the
independence inquiry) and, if not, (2) whether at least one is patentable
(novel and nonobvious) over another. 183
These general principles have been extended to design patent
practice, but, as with the § 112 doctrines, the translation is not
straightforward and the results are unpredictable. A threshold legal
question is whether the inclusion of plural embodiments in a design
patent would offend restrictions on eligible subject matter.18 4 But the
C.C.P.A. summarily rejected this argument long ago.18 5
Another key threshold question is primarily conceptual: Can one
meaningfully speak of multiple "embodiments" of a single design for
design patent purposes, especially given the fact that only designs, not
design concepts, are eligible for design patent protection? For example,
Pacific Coast Marine filed a design patent application directed to boat
windshield designs that disclosed what Pacific Coast asserted were seven
embodiments of a single design, depicted in the drawing figures below: 18 6
181. And, because utility patents may contain multiple claims, it is commonplace for a utility
patent to include some claims that encompass the entire group of disclosed embodiments, and other
claims that may be drawn more narrowly to individual embodiments.
182. 35 U.S.C. § 121 (2012).
183. MPEP, supra note 8, § 802.01.
184. See 35 U.S.C. § 171 (2012) (restricting eligible subject matter to any design for "an article
of manufacture").
185. In re Rubinfield, 270 F.2d 391, 393 (C.C.P.A. 1959). The PTO took the position that § 171's
reference to "an" article of manufacture limited applicants to a single article in any given design
patent application. Id. The C.C.P.A. dismissed this argument, pointing out that § 171 was no more
limited to a single article by its language than was § 101, and it was already well-established that
§ 101 allowed for multiple embodiments of inventions to be disclosed in utility patents. Id.; see also
In re Platner, 155 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 222 (Comm'r Pat. 1967) (rejecting the argument that including
plural embodiments in a design patent application renders the application per se indefinite).
186. Pac. Coast Marine Windshields Ltd. v. Malibu Boats, LLC, 739 F.3d 694, 697-99 (Fed. Cir.
2014); U.S. Patent. No. D555,070 (issued Nov. 13, 2007).
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FIGURE 12: DRAWINGS FROM U.S. DESIGN PATENT APPLICATION SERIAL No. 29/258,753
FIG. 1
FIG. 7
FIG. 10
FIG. 11
FIG. 12FIG. 8
FIG. 9
As shown, the depicted windshields vary according to (1) the
number of vent openings, (2) the shapes of the vent openings, and (3) the
presence or absence of a center hatch. In what sense could these even
conceivably be embodiments of a single design, rather than merely a
group of independent and distinct designs?
At a conceptual level, the answer should be that not every change
to a drawing results in a change to the overall visual impression conveyed
by the drawing, and thus not every variation between drawings should
result in a determination that the drawings depict independent and
distinct designs. Attempting to operationalize that answer in design
patent doctrine, the C.C.P.A. observed in In re Rubinfield that under the
standard for obvious-type double patenting, a designer cannot obtain
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separate patents on designs that are obvious variations of one another. 187
Thus, the court reasoned, drawings that depict obvious or substantially
similar variants ought to be permitted within a single design patent
application (and, it follows, necessarily conceptualized as "embodiments"
of a single "design"). 188
The PTO has attempted to incorporate these principles into its
rules for current restriction practice. The rules expressly permit plural
embodiments of a design in a single design patent application, but caution
that the disclosure should "make clear that multiple embodiments are
disclosed and should particularize the differences between the
embodiments." 1 8 9 The rules also forbid the disclosure of more than one
independent or distinct design. To determine distinctness (the usual issue
in design patent practice), the PTO employs the design patent
obviousness standard, testing whether any given purported embodiment
in the design patent's disclosure is in fact a mere obvious variant of
another.1 90 Purported embodiments that fail this test are treated as
distinct designs that must be restricted out and protected, if at all, in a
separate design patent application.
None of this is quite as easy as it may sound. For example, to
return to the boat windshield drawings, the PTO imposed a restriction
requirement, identifying five designs, not just one, and grouping the
seven depicted windshields in five groups as follows (the groupings being
indicated by the Roman numerals):1 91
187. 270 F.2d at 393-94. The court also invoked Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. 511 (1871), for
the proposition that the scope of a design patent is not limited to identical copies of the depicted
design. Rubinfield, 270 F.2d at 393.
188. The C.C.P.A. also rejected older Commissioner's decisions that had seemed to suggest that
a design patent applicant should subdivide a design into essential and nonessential elements and
provide drawings that depicted only the essential elements. Rubinfield, 270 F.2d at 394 (discussing
Exparte Kahn, 1905 C.D. 212, and Feder v. Poyet, 1899 C.D. 218).
189. MPEP, supra note 8, § 1504.05.
190. The PTO specifies:
[I]t must first be determined whether the embodiments have overall appearances that are
basically the same as each other. If the appearances of the embodiments are considered
to be basically the same, then it must be determined whether the differences are either
minor between the embodiments and not a patentable distinction, or obvious to a designer
of ordinary skill in view of the analogous prior art. If embodiments meet both of the above
criteria they may be retained in a single application. If embodiments do not meet either
one of the above criteria, restriction must be required.
Id. The PTO takes a harder line where the design patent application discloses a design that is
composed of a combination of components, and also separately depicts individual components of the
combination. See id. § 1504.06 (instructing examiners to apply the obviousness standard, but without
looking to any additional "analogous" prior art, an analysis that may be more likely to yield a
conclusion that one embodiment is not an obvious variant of another).
191. Pac. Coast Marine, 739 F.3d at 698.
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FIGURE 13: EXAMINER'S GROUPINGS FROM U.S. DESIGN PATENT
APPLICATION SERIAL No. 29/258,753
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Our point is not to quarrel with the examiner's groupings or to
pick apart the underlying obviousness analyses. Rather, it is to suggest
that there are difficult doctrinal and conceptual issues here below the
surface that warrant discussion. One doctrinal issue is that of
perspective: obviousness is determined from the perspective of the
hypothetical ordinary designer, but infringement is determined from the
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perspective of the ordinary observer. 192 It is not self-evident which
perspective should govern the question of whether variations among
drawings constitute embodiments of a single design. Second, the
obviousness standard embedded in the PTO's analysis has never been
squarely examined at the Federal Circuit or the Supreme Court to
determine whether it satisfies the Supreme Court's expectations for
obviousness analysis set forth in the KSR utility patent decision. 193
Third, it is remarkably difficult to extract from the PTO's
restriction practice any clear conception of what constitutes the design
subject matter in a given design patent. In the Pacific Marine example,
even accepting the PTO's restriction rules, a reasonable analysis might
lead to a conclusion that there are seven designs-or one design-or five.
Utility patent rhetoric, which draws on notions that there are such things
as "embodiments" of designs, only lends further confusion to the analysis.
CONCLUSION
Our analysis identifies three major challenges lying ahead for
disclosure doctrine and theory in design patent law. First, design patent
law must do a better job of developing rules that reflect the insistence on
predominantly visual disclosure. But this is not merely an exercise in
borrowing rules ad hoc from utility patent law, because the vast
jurisprudence developed there for adequacy of disclosure is deeply infused
with linguistic inquiries that take for granted that the technical
disclosure will be rendered predominantly in writing. If this task proves
too much for design patent law, it may be time to rethink the nearly
exclusive reliance on visual information in design patent documents.
Second, design patent rules on disclosure must be framed in
language that recognizes that the disclosure and the claim are not readily
segregable in design patents. This is crucial because the rhetoric of utility
patent disclosure doctrine takes as an article of faith that one can talk
sensibly about a "description" separate of a "claim."194 Design patent rules
are merely circular when framed in that same rhetoric.
Third, design patent law ultimately must arrive at a coherent
notion of the protected subject matter. Modern design patent disclosure
cases often seem inconsequential on the surface, but they often pose (and
192. When Rubinfield was decided, the perspective to be used for obviousness had not been
settled definitively. See In re Nalbandian, 661 F.2d 1214, 1214 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (adopting the
"ordinary designer" standard).
193. See KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
194. See, e.g., Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en
banc) (stating that "[c]laims define and circumscribe" while "the written description discloses and
teaches").
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leave unanswered) difficult questions about the object of design patent
protection, a fundamental question in any intellectual property regime.
APPENDIX: EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY
A. Sampling
We collected the design patent numbers, grant dates, and class
information used in this study through a series of Freedom of Information
Act requests with the PTO. We removed withdrawn patents, yielding a
population of 134,171 design patents. 195 We used this dataset to create a
stratified random sample that was proportionally allocated by year of
grant. 196 This approach was intended to ensure that our sample was not
overly concentrated with newer patents, since patenting rates have
grown tremendously over the years and our initial historical research
indicated that we were likely to observe changes in the patents'
disclosures over time. The resulting sample included 11,870 design
patents and reflects about 8.85% of the total patents granted during this
time period.
In addition to being proportionally allocated by year, the resulting
sample is also representative of the most common design sectors patented
during this era. Figure 14 below compares the parent class data from our
sample with the population of all design patents granted over this period.
195. Of these 134,171 non-withdrawn design patents, 90 were reissued. The design patents span
from U.S. Patent No. D1 (issued Nov. 9, 1842) to U.S. Patent No. D134,277 (issued Nov. 3, 1842).
196. We set the range by issue dates because filing dates are unknown for the early patents in
the dataset. For STATA users interested in reproducing the sample, we set the seed to 38846785,
which was the serial number of a dollar bill found in one of the author's pockets that day.
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FIGURE 14: SHARE OF DESIGN PATENTS GRANTED BY PARENT CLASS (1842 TO 1942)
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As exemplified by the proximity of each class's markers in the
figure, our sample's class composition tracks well with the population.
Indeed, when comparing the sample and population targets, the thirty-
three parent classes only varied from each other by about 0.086%, on
average.1 97 Based on the limited information available about the broader
population of design patents, by randomly sampling via proportional
allocation by year, our sample appears adequately representative of
design patents granted over the regime's first century.
B. Coding & Reliability
Because existing datasets, like those at the PTO, use low-quality
digital scans of old design patents, we manually coded all of the
disclosure-related metrics that were used in this study. To accomplish
this, we collaborated with a group of research assistants at the Indiana
University Maurer School of Law during the 2015-2016 school year that
197. Min=0.0043, Qi=0.0219, Q2=0.0612, Q3=0.1328, Max=0.2560. While the importance of
these differences varies by relative quantity, even in classes with small compositions these
differences were slight. For example, when comparing the twenty-one classes whose share of total
patents granted was less than 2%, our sample only varies from the target population by about
0.0873% on average (Min=0.0067, Qi=0.0232, Q3=0.1328, Max=0.2560).
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were in their second or third years of law school and enrolled in various
intellectual property law courses. 198 All members of the group attended a
series of informational meetings about the project and were given the
same code book and examples prior to beginning. In addition, we met
regularly with the group throughout the process to ensure uniformity.
However, coders were not informed about our research hypotheses during
the process.
Each student received an equal subset of design patents to code,
which were assigned on a rolling basis by (grant) year to ensure an equal
distribution of coders across the dataset's full timeline. About 10% of the
sample was double coded to assess interrater reliability. Since some of
the patents are incomplete-such as those missing drawings or a
description-we rounded up and double coded 1,200 patents (i.e., 10.1%
of the sample). Each of the core variables are discussed in further detail
below. All were within acceptable interrater reliability norms.
1. Written Description (including Claims)
To assess the amount of verbal content found in design patents,
coders first measured the length of each patent's written description
(including claims). We opted for a length measurement over a simple
word count analysis because of the poor quality of the scanned patents
found in the Patent Office's full-image database, whose scanning artifacts
artificially inflate their word counts. Our coders measured the length of
each patent by hand, using Adobe Acrobat's "Distance Tool" to obtain a
consistent calibration across all patents and coders. These measurements
represent the height (inches) of the written content found below the
patent's title and bibliographic information--i.e., the written description
(including the claims).
Our coders measured these distances down to a hundredth of an
inch. If a patent's description spanned more than one page, each page's
measurements were added together. Since there was a high degree of
heterogeneity in the captions-largely due to changes in the fonts and
spacing over this time-our coders did not include the captions in their
measurements. While we would have preferred to measure the length of
written description separately from the claims, the Patent Office's two-
column format made this impossible. The old patents also lacked uniform
column widths and line references, which might have made this feasible.
We found that about 94% of the measurements in our double coded
set were within 0.10 inches of those in our main sample (i.e., 1,124 of
198. Special thanks to Jeffrey Furminger, Daniel Parks, Sarah Rounsifer, Betsy Tao, and
Wenkai Tzeng.
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1,200). Additionally, the intraclass correlation coefficient-which is
bound between 0 and 1, where 1 indicates perfect correlation-was
0.97220, indicating the variable was highly reliable.
After measuring the length of each specification, coders also
recorded whether each patent's specification was handwritten and the
quantity of claims that it contained. Interrater reliability for both metrics
was excellent: Of the 1,200 double coded patents, we observed a 100%
match rate for both. Since we observed perfect agreement, the Cohen
Kappa statistic-which ranges from 0 to 1, where higher values indicate
that agreement is less likely to be attributable to chance, and is therefore
more reliable-for both variables was a perfect 1.
2. Figures
To assess the amount of visual information found in design
patents, we coded their quantity of figures and type of representation (i.e.,
photograph or drawing). While counting the number of figures in a design
patent is quite easy today, this proved more difficult over the time horizon
in our sample due to the lack of figure numbering, missing descriptions,
and the poor quality of many of the old scanned patents (often making it
difficult to distinguish some cross-sectional and side views from simple
scratches on the scans). 199 Nonetheless, interrater reliability was high.
Even if we include fonts-which are most likely to be miscounted-only
27 of the 1,200 double coded patents did not match the quantity of figures
coded in our initial sample, resulting in a 98% rate of agreement. As
another very strong indicator of its reliability, this variable's Cohen
Kappa was 0.9661.200
Coders also indicated whether the figures appeared to be a
photograph or drawing of the claimed design. The interrater reliability of
our sample was high, resulting in a 97% rate of agreement with those in
our double coded sample (1,169 of 1,200). Additionally, the Cohen Kappa
statistic for this variable was 0.7423, indicating the strength of
agreement was substantial.20 1
199. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. D950 (issued Oct. 13, 1857).
200. While the number of figures is technically a continuous variable, we have treated it as an
ordinal variable here because of the observed lack of variability.
201. See J. Richard Landis & Gary G. Koch, The Measurement of Observer Agreement for
Categorical Data, 33 BIOMETRICS 159, 165 (1977).
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